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I. INTRODUCTION
I wish first to thank the organizers for putting on this splendid
international event. We all benefit from the experience of other
jurisdictions in addressing issues similar to those we deal with at
home. I am therefore very grateful to Professor Barker for gra-
ciously inviting me to participate. As the Canadian correspon-
dent, I am conscious of treading in the large footprints left by the
former Chief Justice of our Court, the Honourable John Richard,
who so ably represented Canada at four of these seminars.
My presentation has four parts. First, a brief introduction to
review the principal features of Canada's constitution in order to
provide context to the issues raised subsequently. The next sec-
tion describes two current issues of federalism: national unity and
a national regulatory regime for the securities industry. My next
* Justice, Federal Court of Appeal, Ottawa, Canada. Justice Evans acknowledges
that his paper greatly benefited from the meticulous research and keen editorial eye of
Laura Dougan, his current law clerk, to whom he is most grateful. This paper constitutes
speaking notes that were prepared for a presentation at the Current Constitutional Issues
in the Americas seminar held at Duquesne University School of Law, Pittsburgh, from
November 9, 2012 to November 10, 2012.
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section concerns the constitutional protections afforded by the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to Canadian citizens who
are outside Canada and wish to return, and to non-citizens de-
tained in Canada who have not been charged with the commission
of a crime in Canada but who are believed to pose a threat to na-
tional security. The final section examines the development of a
constitutional right of Aboriginal peoples to be consulted before
governmental action is taken that may adversely affect a substan-
tive Aboriginal right.
Finally, I should add that my position as a sitting appellate
court judge inevitably constrains my ability to offer my own views
on how any of the contested legal issues discussed in this paper
should be resolved, or to suggest that apparently settled questions
have been wrongly decided and should be reopened. Nonetheless,
I shall do my best to avoid merely serving up a dry catalogue of
the recent constitutional doings of our courts.
II. CANADA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW
I have identified the following features of Canada's constitution
that may provide some useful context to what follows.
First, the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, Canada's
founding constitutional document, states that the constitution of
the new confederation is "similar in Principle to that of the United
Kingdom."' Thus, Canada is a constitutional monarchy. The
Queen is the head of state, but her powers are exercised in Can-
ada by the Governor-General. By constitutional convention, the
Crown's powers are normally only exercised in accordance with
the advice of Government Ministers. By convention, Ministers are
members of the House of Commons or Senate and are responsible
to Parliament for the actions of the Executive. The Government is
formed by the political party that can command a majority in the
House of Commons. Canada is also a parliamentary democracy in
which Parliament enjoys legislative supremacy, although a Gov-
ernment with an absolute majority in the House of Commons, re-
inforced by strict party discipline, is generally able to ensure that
the measures that it introduces are enacted. To a large extent,
the constitutional relationship between Legislative and Executive
1. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II,
no. 5 (Can.).
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branches of Government in Canada is, like the United Kingdom,
the subject of unwritten law and constitutional conventions.
Second, unlike the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the
United Kingdom, the supremacy of the legislative branch in Can-
ada is subject to the provisions of the formal constitution con-
tained in the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982.2 It is the function of
the judiciary, whose independence of the other two branches of
government is guaranteed by sections 96 to100 of the Constitution
Act of 1867 and by an unwritten principle of the Constitution, to
determine whether impugned legislation contravenes the constitu-
tion, the supreme law of the land, and, if it does, to provide an ap-
propriate remedy, including a declaration that the law is invalid
and of no force or effect.'
Third, Canada is a federation in which the legislative powers of
the Parliament of Canada on the one hand, and the legislatures of
the provinces on the other, are listed in the Constitution Act of
1867.4 Constitutional historians generally agree that the drafters
of the Constitution intended to create a strong central govern-
ment, vesting in the Parliament of Canada legislative competence
over, for example, the criminal law, the regulation of trade and
commerce, and a residual power to legislate for the peace, order,
and good government of Canada.' Furthermore, in the event of a
conflict between federal and provincial laws, the federal law pre-
vails.
However, from the earliest days when the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in London was the ultimate court of appeal from
the courts of the colonies, the courts, for the most part, have not
shared this centralist view of the constitution. In particular, they
have read the trade and commerce power narrowly,' and given a
2. Id.; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
3. N. Telecom Can. Ltd. v. Commc'n Workers of Can., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 733, 741 (Can.);
Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of P.E.I., [1997] S.C.R. 3, paras. 123-24
(Can.).
4. Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 91-92 (Can.).
5. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (5th ed. 2007).
6. The leading case on the interpretation of the trade and commerce power under s
91(2) of the Constitution Act,1867 is Citizens Ins. Co. of Can. v. Parsons, [1881] 4 S.C.R.
215, 7 (Can.). The approach in Parsons was affirmed in later cases such as: MacDonald v.
Vapor Can. Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 (Can.); Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Can. Nat'l Transp.,Ltd.,
[19831 2 S.C.R. 206; Gen. Motors of Can. Ltd. v. City Nat'1 Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641
(Can.) (which set out the test for what falls within the general branch of the trade and
commerce power); Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 (Can.). For further
description of the development of this power, see Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3
S.C.R. 837, paras. 68-85 (Can.).
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broad interpretation to the exclusive power of provincial legisla-
tures over property and civil rights in the Province, as well as over
matters of a merely local or private nature.
Our courts have rejected an "originalist" approach to constitu-
tional interpretation. Instead, the Constitution is to be regarded
as a "living tree" and interpreted progressively in light of techno-
logical and scientific advances, changing social and economic con-
ditions, and new ideas.' The Supreme Court of Canada currently
favours an approach to constitutional interpretation that reflects a
cooperative, flexible model of federalism that accommodates over-
lapping jurisdictions and supports intergovernmental efforts.'
However, as the Court has also recently reminded us, a flexible
interpretative approach does not warrant reading the Constitution
in a manner that lacks "respect for the constitutional division of
powers and the maintenance of a constitutional balance between
federal and provincial powers."o
Fourth, in 1982 Canada added the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms to its Constitution," which gave constitutional pro-
tection to the individual rights that it describes. Provincial or fed-
eral legislation, or administrative action, that infringes upon any
of these rights is of no force or effect. However, section 1 of the
Charter provides that these rights are "subject only to such rea-
sonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."12 Moreover, as a compromise
between the traditional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and
constitutionally entrenched rights, the Charter enables Parlia-
ment and provincial legislatures to enact legislation that expressly
overrides most Charter-protected rights."
7. See Canada (Att'y Gen) v. Ontario (Att'y Gen.), [19371 AC 326, 354 (in which Lord
Atkin stated that the powers set out in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867
should be viewed as "watertight compartments."). For general discussion of the develop-
ment of the provincial powers over property and civil rights and matters of a local and
private nature, see HOGG, supra note 5, at ch. 21.
8. Edwards v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [1930] AC 124,136; Reference re Employment
Insurance Act, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, para. 9; Securities Act, para. 56.
9. See, e.g., F6ddration des producteurs de volailles du Que. v. Pelland, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
292, para. 15 (Can.); Can. W. Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 SCR 3, para. 24 (Can.); Reference re
Securities Act, [20111 3 S.C.R. 837, para. 57 (Can.).
10. Reference re Securities Act, 3 S.C.R. 837, para. 61.
11. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K).
12. Id. § 1.
13. Id. § 33.
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Fifth, the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada,
who include the Indian, M6tis, and Inuit peoples of Canada.14
Much remains to be done to improve the sorry economic and social
plight of too many of Canada's first peoples.
Sixth, the Constitution Act, 1982 removes the last legal vestiges
of Canada's history as a colony of the United Kingdom by "patriat-
ing" the Constitution. That is, it enables constitutional amend-
ments to be made in Canada, in accordance with a complex
amending formula, without reference to the Parliament of the
United Kingdom."
III. Two CURRENT FEDERALISM ISSUES
A. The National Unity Question: Breaking Up Is Hard (But Not
Impossible) to Do
The existential question of the place of the Province of Quebec,
within or without the Canadian Confederation, is always with us.
The distinctiveness of Qu6bec derives from the fact that it is
largely French speaking, and has a strong cultural identity, as
well as history and political and social traditions, not shared with
the rest of Canada. In an acknowledgment of these characteris-
tics, the federal Parliament recently passed a resolution recogniz-
ing the Qubb6cois as a nation ("une nation") within Canada."6
Over the years, the urgency of the possible separation of Quebec
from the Confederation has ebbed and flowed.
After the narrow defeat in 1995 of a referendum initiated by a
provincial government formed by the separatist Parti Qu6b6cois
("PQ"), and anticipating that another referendum could be held,
the Government of Canada requested an advisory opinion from
the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutional validity of the
unilateral secession of a province from the Confederation."
In a statesmanlike opinion, the Court held that neither the Ca-
nadian Constitution nor international law permits unilateral se-
cession." However, it also acknowledged that if the government of
14. Id. §§ 25, 35.
15. Id. § 38.
16. Parliament, Votes and Proceedings, 39th Parl., 1st Sess, No 72 (November, 27 2006)
(Can.).
17. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
18. Id. at para. 155.
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a seceding province established control over its territory and was
recognized by the international community, the Canadian Consti-
tution would eventually have to come to terms with the reality
that the province had indeed become an independent state and
had ceased to be part of Canada." More interestingly, the Court
also went on to infer from the underlying constitutional principles
of the rule of law and from federalism that a clear majority in a
provincial referendum for secession on a clear question would
compel the Government of Canada and the other provinces to ne-
gotiate in good faith with the dissident province to amend the
Constitution to respond to the democratically expressed desire of
the electorate to secede.20
In 2000, Parliament sought specificity with respect to the condi-
tions triggering constitutional negotiations, which the Supreme
Court of Canada had stated should be decided by politicians, not
the courts: namely, whether the question on which the electorate
had voted was "clear" and whether there was a "clear majority" for
secession.2 ' Section 1 of the Clarity Act provides that to be "clear,"
the question put to the electorate must result in the "clear expres-
sion of the will of the population of a province on whether the
province should cease to be part of Canada and become an inde-
pendent state."22 A question designed merely to give a provincial
government a mandate to negotiate independence, or a question
that proposes merely different economic and political arrange-
ments with Canada without specifying secession, would not be
"clear" for this purpose.23
If the House of Commons determines that the question put to
the electorate was "clear" and a majority of the votes cast were in
favour of secession, section 2 of the Clarity Act requires the House
of Commons to consider if the majority was "clear."24 However,
instead of specifying a precise minimum percentage of the votes
needed for a "clear" majority, the Act directs the House to deter-
mine whether the majority is "clear" by taking into account the
size of the majority, the percentage of eligible voters who cast a
vote and "any other matters or circumstances it considers to be
19. Id. at para. 106.
20. Id. at paras. 88-92.
21. Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26, § 1 (Can.).
22. Id. § 1(3).
23. Id. § 1(4)(a)(b).
24. Id. § 2(1).
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relevant."25 Without a clear majority on a clear question, subsec-
tion 1(6) of the Clarity Act forbids the Government of Canada from
entering into secession negotiations with a province.26
Concerns about the possibility of secession have recently re-
turned to the Canadian scene. In September, 2012, the PQ was
elected to form the Government of Qu6bec. The PQ Government is
pledged to hold a third referendum on secession at some time and
in some circumstances, as yet to be defined. Paradoxically, popu-
lar support for secession seems to be currently running at signifi-
cantly less than the 40% of recent historical levels.2 7 Moreover,
the PQ is four seats short of an overall majority in the provincial
legislature, L'Assembl6e Nationale, which means that the opposi-
tion parties can combine to defeat the Government on major issues
with which they disagree, including the holding of a secession ref-
erendum.
For these two reasons, it is unlikely that we shall be forced at
any time soon to figure out the precise scope of the duty imposed
by the Supreme Court on the parties to the Confederation to nego-
tiate in good faith following a referendum in which a clear major-
ity voted for secession on a clear question. However, demands by
the Government of Qu6bec for the transfer of powers to it may
pose some political problems for the federal Government in fash-
ioning an appropriate response.
B. The Regulation of the Securities Industry: Still Not a Matter
of National Concern
A less fundamental but nonetheless important and long-
standing issue of Canadian federalism concerns the power of the
federal Parliament to create a national scheme to regulate the is-
suing and trading of securities to supersede the current arrange-
ments under which each province operates its own regime for
regulating the securities industry within its boundaries. Provin-
25. Id. § 2(2).
26. Id. § 1(6).
27. Jeffrey Simpson, Do we care if another tussle for Quebec sovereignty happens now?,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 1, 2012),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/elections/do-we-care-if-another-tussle-for-
quebec-sovereignty-happens-now/article4513853/ (citing a recent CROP survey putting
support for sovereignty at 28%); PQ's election chance raises referendum questions, THE
CANADIAN PRESS (Sept. 3, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/quebeevotes20l2/story/2012/09/03/parti-quebecois-
referendum.html.
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cial securities legislation is enacted pursuant to the provinces' leg-
islative power over property and civil rights in the Province, and
matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province.28
Ontario is the most important capital market in Canada, espe-
cially for large corporations in the financial services and mining
sectors. It is the home of Canada's biggest stock market, the To-
ronto Stock Exchange, and of the senior provincial securities regu-
latory agency, the Ontario Securities Commission. Qu6bec is also
a significant financial centre, especially for technology listings:
the Montr6al Stock Exchange is also an important market for
bonds and derivatives. Capital for smaller mining and energy
ventures, which tend to be somewhat speculative in nature, is
mainly raised in the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia,
which set the rules applicable to the issue of shares and other se-
curities within their jurisdiction. Despite these regional speciali-
zations, most issuers raise capital and report in more than one
jurisdiction, and most large companies raise capital nationally.
Proponents of legislative reform argue that a single national se-
curities regulator would make for a more efficient capital market
in which issuers of securities would have to comply with only one
set of regulatory rules. Such a scheme, it is said, would also pro-
vide more effective consumer protection for investors. The need to
replace the present "patchwork" arrangements is argued to be
particularly pressing because of the emergence of an integrated
capital market, both nationally and internationally, and of ever
larger and more sophisticated schemes designed to defraud inves-
tors.29
After many reports on the subject by different individuals and
organizations over a period of more than forty years, in 2011 the
Government published draft legislation establishing a national
securities regulatory scheme administered by a single regulator.
It referred the proposed measure, the Securities Act," to the Su-
28. Reference re Securities Act, [20111 3 S.C.R. 837, para. 126 (Can.). For examples of
provincial legislation, see: Securities Act, R.S.Y. 2007, c. 16 (Can. Yukon); Securities Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can. B.C.); Securities Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S-13 (Can. Nfld.); Securi-
ties Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4 (Can. Alta.); Securities Act, SNu 2008, c. 12 (Can. Nun.); Secu-
rities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 418 (Can. N.S.); Securities Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-3.1 (Can.
P.E.I.); Securities Act, R.S.N.W.T. 2008, c. 10 (Can. N.W.T.); Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
S.5 (Can. Ont.); Securities Act, R.S.N.B. 2004, c. S-5.5 (Can. N.B.); Securities Act, R.S.S.
1988-89, c. S-42.2 (Can. Sask.); Securities Act, C.C.S.M. c. S-50 (Can. Man.).
29. See generally Thomas Hockin et al., Expert Panel on Securities Regulation Final
Report and Recommendations, OTTAWA: DEP'T OF FIN. (2009) (Can.).
30. In 2009, the Government of Canada created the Canadian Securities Transition
Office ("CSTO") to manage the transition to national securities regulation. Although the
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preme Court of Canada for an advisory opinion on its constitu-
tional validity.1 The Government relied on federal competence
over the regulation of trade and commerce to support the Act.
Read literally, Parliament's power to regulate trade and com-
merce could, through the doctrine that federal laws prevail over
conflicting provincial laws, effectively displace the provinces'
power to regulate economic activity within their boundaries as
matters of property and civil rights, or of a merely local or private
nature." In fact, the commerce clause has been interpreted by the
courts as having two components: first, interprovincial and inter-
national trade and commerce, and second, matters relating to
trade and commerce that are genuinely national in scope." The
latter is known as the "general branch" of the commerce clause
and was the one on which the Government built its case for the
validity of the Securities Act.34
It was conceded that some aspects of securities trading are in-
ter-provincial in scope, and thus potentially subject to federal
regulation. However, this was not the basis on which the Gov-
ernment of Canada chose to proceed, and the Court did not com-
ment on the extent to which Parliament could rely on the inter-
provincial branch of the trade and commerce power to design a
national scheme to regulate the securities market." Since the Se-
curities Act was designed to create a comprehensive scheme, it
stood or fell as a whole."
To the surprise, not to say consternation, of many constitutional
commentators (but by no means all), the Court unanimously held
the proposed Securities Act to be invalid as beyond the legislative
proposed Securities Act discussed by the Supreme Court was never introduced into Parlia-
ment, a draft of the legislation was developed by the Department of Finance and was pub-
lished on the website of the CSTO. See Proposed Canadian Securities Act, DEPARTMENT OF
FIN. (May 25, 2005), http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm.pdf.
31. Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, paras. 11-28 (Can.). Prior to the
Supreme Court reference, both the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Quebec Court of Appeal
had concluded that the proposed Act was unconstitutional. Reference re Securities Act,
[20111 ABCA 77, 41 Alta LR (5th) 145 (Can. Alta); Qu6bec (Procureurgd6ral) c. Canada
(Procureurg6ndral), [2011] QCCA 591 (Can. Que.).
32. Reference re Securities Act, 3 S.C.R. 837 at para. 72.
33. Id. at paras. 46, 75; see also Citizens Ins. Co. of Can. v. Parsons, [1881] 4 S.C.R.
215, 300 (Can.).
34. Reference re Securities Act, 3 S.C.R. 837 at paras. 5-6, 32.
35. Id. at para. 129; see also Jeremy Fraiberg, National Securities Regulator: The Road
Ahead, 52 CAN. Bus. L.J. 174 (2012) for further discussion on the other options available to
the government for proceeding with a national securities regulator.
36. Reference re Securities Act, para. 91.
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competence of Parliament.3 ' The "pith and substance" of the Act's
subject matter, the Court held, concerned property and civil rights
in the provinces." It was not supportable under the general
branch of the commerce clause because it was not primarily fo-
cused on matters genuinely national in scope that are qualita-
tively different from those falling under the provincial heads of
power over property and civil rights in the province or matters of a
merely local nature."
The core of the Court's objection to the Act was the comprehen-
sive scope of the regulatory scheme that it created, including day-
to-day trading activities, the registration of brokers and other
market participants, and standards of conduct for trading - all
matters that are currently the subject of provincial legislation.40
In order to fall within the general branch of the commerce clause
as being "genuinely national in scope," the Court said, a matter
must be something that the provinces either individually or collec-
tively could not effectively achieve.4 1 A broader reading of the
commerce clause, it stated, would result in the duplication and
replacement of functions already performed by the provinces,
thereby upsetting the constitutional balance of powers underlying
Canadian federalism.4 2 It was not for the Court to determine the
optimal regulatory scheme; that was a matter of policy for politi-
cians to work out, not law.43
The Court conceded, however, that the evolution of securities
markets presented challenges that can only be adequately ad-
dressed at the national level through federal legislation.44 In its
view, systemic risk management and data collection fall within
the commerce clause because these are functions that the prov-
inces could not effectively perform.45 Nonetheless, the Court was
37. For commentary on the Supreme Court's decision, see Fraiberg, supra note 35;
Jeffrey MacIntosh, Politics, Not Law, 52 CAN. Bus. L.J. 179 (2012); Eric Spink, Reacting to
the Status Quo in Securities Regulation, 52 CAN. BUS. L.J. 182 (2012); Stophane Rousseau,
Endgame: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision on the Project to Create a National
Securities Regulator, 52 CAN. Bus. L.J. 186 (2012); Poonam Puri, The Supreme Court's
Securities Act Reference Fails to Demonstrate an Understanding of the Canadian Capital
Markets, 52 CAN. Bus. L.J. 190 (2012).
38. Reference re Securities Act, 3 S.C.R. 837 at paras. 116, 128.
39. Id. at paras. 124-25.
40. Id. at paras. 100-11, 106, 116, 122-23.
41. Id. at para. 83.
42. Id. at paras. 7, 101, 106.
43. Id. at paras. 90, 127.
44. Id. at para. 128.
45. Id. at paras. 104-05, 121, 128.
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not persuaded that changes in the securities market were such as
to warrant regarding all securities issuing and trading as a matter
of national scope beyond the ability of the provinces to effectively
regulate." The inability of Parliament to regulate all aspects of
the securities industry in Canada would not create a "constitu-
tional gap."47
In order to leave room for provincial choice, the proposed Securi-
ties Act would only replace a provincial scheme when the Province
opted into the federal scheme; the Act thus contemplated that it
would not necessarily apply in all provinces. Further, the pro-
posed Act largely mirrors existing provincial legislation.4 8 How-
ever, rather than regarding these features of the Act as appropri-
ate nods to co-operative federalism, the Court took them to be in-
dicators that the securities market in Canada could be effectively
regulated without a comprehensive national regulatory scheme
administered by a single regulator.49
Finally, the Court emphasized that under its decision that the
Securities Act was ultra vires, the general branch of Parliament's
power under the trade and commerce clause did not prevent fed-
eral and provincial authorities from co-operating to produce a
regulatory scheme that was both effective and respected the scope
of their respective legislative powers, as had occurred in other fed-
eral jurisdictions. 0
Commentators are divided on whether it is feasible for any such
agreement to be reached." I would not have thought that history
is on the side of the optimists!
IV. CURRENT CHARTER ISSUES
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms very quickly be-
came an integral part of Canada's public law following its inclu-
sion in the Constitution in 1982. Over the last thirty years, its
impact on many major social and criminal justice issues of the day
has been extraordinary. Here are a few examples.
The refugee determination system was held to be invalid be-
cause it did not provide claimants with an oral hearing before the
46. Id. at paras. 117, 122.
47. Id. at para. 83.
48. Id. at para. 116.
49. Id.
50. Id. at paras. 130-31.
51. See Fraiberg, supra note 35; MacIntosh, supra note 37; Spink, supra note 37; Rous-
seau, supra note 37; Puri, supra note 37.
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decision-maker.52  Criminal law restrictions on a woman's access
to abortion were struck down." Prosecutors are required to make
extensive disclosure of evidence potentially relevant to an accused
person's defence.54 The legal definition of marriage that precludes
marriage between same-sex couples has been held to be a denial of
the right to equality. 5 The Government may only extradite a citi-
zen to stand trial on a charge in a foreign jurisdiction where con-
viction carries the death penalty, if it has obtained an undertaking
from the prosecuting authorities in the foreign state that, in the
event of a conviction, they will not request the execution of the
accused." And, an appellate court recently struck down provi-
sions that criminalized the acts of living off the avails of prostitu-
tion and operating a brothel, on the ground that their effect was to
increase unjustifiably the risks of bodily harm facing sex work-
ers. 57
While all these topics were controversial at the time, no area
provides a more severe test of a state's commitment to the protec-
tion of individual liberty than action taken in the name of national
security in the face of a widely shared perception that a serious
threat exists to the safety and well-being of the population. The
events of September 11, 2001, the subsequent bombings in London
and Madrid, as well as several other potentially devastating ter-
rorist plots, provide the essential context for the current version of
the age-old challenge that has faced democracies committed to the
rule of law: balancing fundamental rights against threats to na-
tional security.
52. Singh v. Minister of Emp't and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.).
53. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
54. R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.).
55. Halpern v. Canada (Att'y General) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161, 225 D.L.R. 4th 529 (Can.
Ont.). Shortly after the decision in Halpern, the Government of Canada proposed legisla-
tion that would change the legal definition of marriage to include same-sex couples and
asked the Supreme Court to determine its constitutionality. In Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.), the Supreme Court held that the draft legislation
including same-sex couples within the definition of marriage was consistent with the Char-
ter. In 2005, the Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.), was passed and defines mar-
riage for civil purposes as "the lawful union of two persons." Id. § 2.
56. U.S. v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.); see also Suresh v. Canada, [20021 1 S.C.R.
3 (Can.) (similar decision regarding the deportation, as opposed to the extradition of non-
citizens).
57. Canada (Att'y General) v. Bedford, 12012] O.N.C.A. 186, paras. 253-55, 325 (Can.
Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been requested). On a
third issue of communicating for the purpose of prostitution in public, the Court, by a ma-
jority, allowed the Crown's appeal and upheld the provision on the ground that it was in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Id.
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When the state impinges on constitutionally protected individ-
ual rights, the task of reviewing whether an appropriate balance
has been struck ultimately falls to the courts. An important ques-
tion of institutional competence and legitimacy is also at play in
these cases. The Executive is responsible and politically account-
able for the critical issue of public safety, and it has a unique
wealth of knowledge for assessing national security risks. Given
these considerations, how deferential should the courts be in re-
viewing the constitutionality of the limitations imposed on rights
in the name of national security?
In Canada, the courts have adopted the notion that a successful
constitutional challenge to the validity of legislation is not neces-
sarily the last word on the matter but can result in a constructive
"dialogue" between the Judiciary and Parliament." This, it is
said, promotes democratic debate and results in a solution that
permits Parliament to advance important public policy objectives
in a manner that is least intrusive on constitutional rights.
A. Detention and Deportation
Striking the right balance between the public interest in na-
tional security and constitutionally protected rights may arise in a
variety of legal contexts. However, in Canada most of the high
profile litigation has arisen in connection with the detention of five
non-citizens under security certificates signed by two Ministers
pending their removal from Canada." Security certificates state
58. For Supreme Court cases endorsing the notion of "dialogue," see Vriend v. Alberta,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, paras. 138-39 (Can.), R v. Mills, [19991 3 S.C.R. 668, paras. 20, 57, 125
(Can.), and Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 576, paras. 104-08.
For academic discussion of "dialogue theory," see generally KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME
COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001); Rosalind Dixon,
The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
235 (2009); Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All), 35
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997); Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K
Wright, Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors', 45 Osgoode Hall L.J.
2 (2007); Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme
Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. BAR. REV. 481 (2001); Kent Roach, Dialogic
Judicial Review and its Critics, 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 49, 54 (2004); Kent Roach, Consti-
tutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience,
40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 537 (2005); Kent Roach, A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled
Dialogue: Justice lacobucci's Substantive Approach to Dialogue, 57 U. Toronto L.J. 449
(2007).
59. The five individuals subject to security certificates were Mohamed Harkat, Adil
Charkaoui, Mohammad Mahjoub, Hassan Almrei, Mahmoud Jaballah. See Charkaoui v.
Canada [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.).
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that the named persons are inadmissible to Canada on the ground
that their presence is reasonably believed to pose a threat to na-
tional security by virtue of their terrorism-related activities." As
lawyers are prone to do, the Supreme Court of Canada has relied
heavily on procedural protections as the principal means of medi-
ating the conflicting demands of public safety and individual
rights, but has been more nuanced on the substantive aspects of
indefinite detention of non-citizens.61
The reason for the prolonged detention of the five named indi-
viduals in question was that they are nationals of countries where
they fear they will be tortured or otherwise persecuted if they are
returned there. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that, save
in exceptional (but unspecified) circumstances, it is a violation of
the constitutional right not to be deprived of security of the person
other than in accordance with the principles of fundamental jus-
tice for the state to remove a person to a country where he or she
would face a substantial risk of torture.6 2 Thus, while non-citizens
are formally being detained pending their deportation on national
security grounds, the link between detention and removal has be-
come increasingly attenuated over time, so that, in the words of
one commentator, their detention resembles "a preventive deten-
tion regime rather than detention for the purpose facilitating re-
moval."" Successful criminal prosecution in Canada is generally
regarded as an impracticable alternative.
The Government has relied largely on highly sensitive intelli-
gence information to support the reasonableness of its belief that
detainees have been involved in terrorist activities and pose a con-
tinuing threat to Canada's security. To disclose such information
to detainees or their lawyers for the purpose of challenging the
reasonableness of the security certificate or detention could poten-
tially endanger the lives of informants, jeopardise the continued
flow of valuable information to national security officials, and oth-
erwise disrupt the Government's intelligence-gathering activities.
60. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 77(1). See David Dun-
bar & Scott Nesbitt, Parliament's Response to Charkaoui: Bill C-3 and the Special Advocate
Regime under IRPA, 42 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 435 (2008) for a clear account of the security
certification system and the post-Charkaoui reforms.
61. See, e.g., Rayner Thwaites, Process and Substance: Charkaoui I in the Light of
Subsequent Development, 62 U. N.B. L.J. 13, 14, 17 (2011).
62. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 129 (Can.).
63. Thwaites, supra note 61, at 15.
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In recognition of this problem, the legislation provided that a
summary of the Government's case should be provided to detain-
ees so that they can attempt to answer the case against them at
periodic hearings held before a Federal Court Judge to review the
reasonableness of the security certificate and the continued deten-
tion.' However, the Government may request a hearing from
which the detainee and his lawyer are excluded, in order to pre-
sent to the Judge evidence in support of the certificate or deten-
tion, the disclosure of which would endanger national security.es
Prior to legislative changes that came into effect in 2008, it fell to
the Judge, aided only by Government lawyers, to play an active
role in the "secret" proceeding by critically examining and assess-
ing the adequacy of the documentary evidence, and by probing the
oral testimony of security officials. That the Judge, unlike a com-
missioner conducting a public inquiry, lacks an independent
power to gather evidence inevitably limited the efficacy of the re-
view process.
While upholding the constitutionality of most of the statutory
detention scheme, the Supreme Court held in 2007 that the proce-
dural arrangements did not satisfy the principles of fundamental
justice because they did not provide an adequate opportunity for
detainees to know and answer the case against them." In its rea-
sons for decision, the Court acknowledged that the principles of
fundamental justice do not necessarily require full disclosure of
security-sensitive information. 7 It suggested several options, in-
cluding a system of "special advocates" such as that adopted in the
United Kingdom, which would achieve a more appropriate balance
between individual rights and national security." The Court sus-
pended the declaration of invalidity for a year to enable Parlia-
ment to rework the impugned statutory provisions."
Parliament responded promptly to this "invitation" by amending
the legislation to take up one of the Court's suggestions: special
advocates.o The amendments required the Judge reviewing the
continued detention of an individual to appoint a special advocate
from a list of security-cleared, private sector lawyers to play the
64. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, § 77(2) (Can.).
65. Id. § 83(1)(c).
66. Charkaoui v. Canada, [20071 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.).
67. Id. at para. 24.
68. Id. at paras. 57, 70-84.
69. Id. at para. 140.
70. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, §§ 85.1(2), 85.2 (Can.).
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role at the non-public phase of the hearing that in other contexts
would be played by counsel for the detained person: to challenge
the view of the Government on the scope of non-disclosure to the
detainee; to indicate weaknesses, limitations, gaps, and inconsis-
tencies in the confidential documentary evidence on which the
Government relied; to, in effect, cross-examine the witnesses
(typically members of Canada's intelligence service) called by the
Government to testify at the non-public phase of the hearing; and
to make submissions in support of the detainee."
To enable special advocates to perform their task, the Govern-
ment must disclose to them, on the basis of strict confidentiality,
all the material that is presented to the Judge but withheld from
the person concerned and his lawyer.7 2 The Minister of Justice is
obliged to ensure that special advocates have adequate adminis-
trative support and resources."
The role of the special advocate is to protect the interests of the
detained person in the closed phase of the Judge's periodic review
of the reasonableness of the security certificate and the detention
or the conditions on which the person has been released." How-
ever, special advocates are not in a lawyer-client relationship with
the detainee, although communications between them are ex-
pressly deemed by the statute to be covered by solicitor-client
privilege." Once appointed, the special advocate receives a copy of
the summary of the confidential information provided to the de-
tained person, with whom the advocate may meet to discuss the
case." However, after the Government has fully disclosed the con-
fidential information to the special advocate, communication with
the detainee is permitted only with leave of the Judge. This
limitation no doubt imposes a significant fetter on a special advo-
cate's effectiveness.
The constitutionality of this scheme has been upheld by the
Federal Court of Appeal." Given the security interest in protect-
ing the identity of informants, our Court held that the statute
provides a proxy for full disclosure that is sufficient to ensure that
71. Id.
72. Id. § 85.4.
73. Id. § 85(3).
74. Id. § 85.1(1).
75. Id. § 85.1(3)-(4).
76. Id. § 85.4(1).
77. Id. § 85.4(2)(3).
78. Harkat v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,[20121 3 F.C.R. 635, paras. 156-
57 (Can.) (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been requested).
Vol. 51338
a detainee is not being deprived of his liberty in breach of the
principles of fundamental justice.79
It is widely believed that the special advocate procedure has
significantly improved the efficacy of the reasonableness review
process. Two of the five detainees were released in 2009 following
the quashing of the security certificates under which they were
held, while the other three have been conditionally released."o The
ongoing review proceedings have focussed on the scope of disclo-
sure to the persons concerned and the destruction of important
evidence by the security service. How much detainees know of the
case against them is critical to their ability to instruct their spe-
cial advocate at the initial meetings.
B. Coming Home: Canadian Citizens Abroad
I turn now to two cases of Canadian citizens who invoked the
Charter in an attempt to return home. Although both arose out of
the heightened post-9/11 national security concerns, the courts
found the Government to have violated the Charter rights of the
individuals concerned.
The first case concerns a Canadian citizen, Omar Khadr." He
had been captured in Afghanistan in 2002 by U.S. forces following
a gun battle in which an American serviceman was killed by a
grenade, which, U.S. authorities alleged, Khadr had thrown.8 2 He
was fifteen years old at the time and appears to have been "re-
cruited" into Taliban activities by his father." Following his cap-
ture, Khadr was incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay where, among
other things, he was charged with war crimes, and subjected to a
sleep deprivation program to make him more compliant during
interrogation." With knowledge of this mistreatment, and with-
out affording him access to counsel, Canadian officials questioned
Khadr in 2003 and 2004 about matters pertaining to the charges
against him." They then shared tapes of the interviews with U.S.
authorities." The Canadian Government refused Khadr's re-
79. Id. at para. 85.
80. For further discussion on exiting the certificate system for Charkaoui and Almrei,
see Thwaites, supra note 61, at 23-29.
81. Canada (Justice) v. Khadr (Khadr I), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125.
82. Id. at para. 5.
83. Id.
84. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr (Khadr II), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 5.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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peated requests that it ask the United States to return him to
Canada." Other Western countries had successfully requested
the return of their nationals from Guantanamo.
Khadr's legal challenge to the Government's refusal to request
his return raised two issues for the Supreme Court: first, had the
conduct of Canadian officials breached his rights under the Char-
'ter and, second, if it had, what was the appropriate remedy?" On
the first issue, the Court noted that customary international law
and comity normally preclude Canadian citizens from relying on
the Charter to protect them from the conduct of Canadian officials
abroad." However, it held that this case was exceptional; the
Charter applied extraterritorially because the military commis-
sion regime applicable to Guantanamo detainees in 2003 and 2004
violated fundamental human rights protected by international
law."0
The Court went on to find that, while Canada was not primarily
responsible for Khadr's loss of liberty, it had participated in the
illegal regime through its officials' conduct, and had contributed to
the continued deprivation of his liberty by sharing the information
obtained from him with their U.S. counterparts." Moreover, the
Court said, the circumstances of Khadr's interrogation by Cana-
dian officials so "offends the most basic Canadian standards about
the treatment of youth suspects" as to constitute a breach of the
principles of fundamental justice.9 2
However, the Supreme Court did not agree with the lower
courts that the appropriate remedy for this Charter breach was to
order the Government to request the United States to return
Khadr to Canada. 3 While acknowledging that the conduct of for-
eign relations is not a Charter-free zone, the Court stated that
courts should be very reluctant to insert themselves into the Ex-
ecutive's exercise of its broad discretion 'in dealing with other
states by ordering it to make representations to a foreign govern-
ment. Moreover, the evolving nature of the situation, and the
absence from the record of the complete range of options being
87. Id. at para. 6.
88. Id. at para. 11.
89. Khadr I, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, paras. 16-17 (Can.); see also R. v. Hape, [20071 2
S.C.R. 292, para. 48 (Can.).
90. Khadr II, 1 S.C.R. 44 at para. 18 (citing Khadr 1, 2 S.C.R. 125 at paras. 16-17).
91. Id. at para. 21.
92. Id. at para. 25.
93. Id. at para. 38.
94. Id. at paras. 39-40.
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considered by the Government, made it inappropriate to require
the Government at that point to make the representations re-
quested." In the event, the Court simply declared that Khadr's
Charter rights had been violated and left it to the Government to
consider what action to take to remedy the breach"-another ex-
ample of the Court's fondness for constitutional "dialogue" with
the other branches of government.
Having brought you so far in the story, I should not leave you in
suspense! In response to the Supreme Court's invitation, the Gov-
ernment reaffirmed its decision not to request Khadr's repatria-
tion, but requested U.S. authorities not to use the tapes of the in-
terrogations in the criminal proceedings, a request that they
promptly rejected. Khadr challenged the legal adequacy of the
Canadian Government's decision in the Federal Court.
After concluding that the Supreme Court had ordered the Gov-
ernment to fashion a remedy for the Charter breach, the Judge
declared that the Government had acted procedurally unfairly by
deciding on a remedy without affording Khadr an opportunity to
make submissions." The Judge added that, while a request by the
Government for Khadr's return to Canada seemed the only poten-
tial remedy for the violation of his Charter rights that had not yet
been tried, he had decided to give the parties time to explore other
possibilities until a remedy was found that truly cured the Char-
ter breach."
Any appeal from this decision became moot when, in 2010, pur-
suant to a plea bargain, Khadr pleaded guilty before the military
commission to murdering the U.S. soldier and was convicted and
sentenced.'00 In an application for judicial review to the Federal
Court filed earlier this year, Khadr alleged that the Canadian
Government's delay in dealing with his transfer request was un-
reasonable and an abuse of process.' However, this litigation,
too, is now moot: Omar Khadr was returned to Canada at the end
95. Id. at para. 44.
96. Id. at para. 47.
97. Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2010] 4 FCR 36 para. 85.
98. Id. at para 75.
99. Id. at para 95.
100. Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2011 F.C.A. 92, para. 1.
101. Siobhan McClelland, Khadr's Lawyers No Strangers to Int'l Cases, LAW TIMES (Aug.
20, 2012), http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201208209270/Headline-News/Khadrs-lawyers-
no-strangers-to-intl-cases.
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of September of this year to serve out the remainder of his sen-
tence."o2
My second story of a Canadian citizen whose return to Canada
was blocked by the Government, concerns Mr. Abdelrazik, Suda-
nese by origin and still a citizen of Sudan. 10 3 He was recognized as
a refugee in Canada in 1992 and granted permanent residence
status.104 Abdelrazik seems to have come to the attention of the
Canadian intelligence service because he was an acquaintance of a
man convicted in the United States of plotting to blow up an air-
port, and of a person detained in Canada under a security certifi-
cate.' 5 He was never charged with a criminal offence in Can-
ada.106
On his return to Sudan to visit his sick mother in 2003, Abdel-
razik was arrested and detained by Sudanese authorities.0 o
While in detention there, his Canadian passport expired.'o On his
release, he was designated by the U.S. State Department as a per-
son posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism. 09 He
was also listed by a committee of the United Nations Security
Council as an associate of Al-Qaeda, and thereby became subject
to a travel ban."o His name had previously appeared on several
"no-fly" lists."'
Fearing further detention by Sudanese authorities, Abdelrazik
was granted refuge in the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum.112 He
made numerous unsuccessful requests to the Canadian Govern-
ment to issue him with a passport or other travel documentation,
and otherwise to facilitate his return to Canada.113 Having got
nowhere with these requests, he made an application for judicial
review to the Federal Court alleging that the Government's con-
102. Michelle Shephard & Tonda MacCharles, Omar Khadr back in Canada, THE
TORONTO STAR (Sept. 29, 2012),
http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/omarkhadr/article/1264339--omar-khadr-
repatriated-to-canada.
103. Abdelrazik v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), [2010] 2009 F.C.R. 580, para 10.
104. Id.
105. Id. at para. 11.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at paras. 12-14.
109. Id. at para. 22.
110. Id. at para. 23.
111. Id. at para. 11.
112. Id. at para. 30.
113. Id. at paras. 30-33.
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duct effectively denied him his Charter right, as a Canadian citi-
zen, to enter Canada."4
The Court held that the constitutional right of Canadian citi-
zens abroad to enter Canada implicitly obliges the Government to
issue an emergency passport to enable those who meet the pass-
port eligibility criteria to travel to and enter Canada."' It is ir-
relevant that passports are issued through an exercise of a Crown
prerogative, rather than statute. While the administrative crite-
ria governing the issue and revocation of passports authorize the
Minister of Foreign Affairs to refuse a passport on national secu-
rity grounds, the Court held that this did not justify the Charter
breach in this case."' Abdelrazik had not been given prior notice
of, and an opportunity to respond to, the allegations, as the crite-
ria required, and the Government had offered no evidence to sup-
port the view that he was a threat to national security."'
As for the travel ban imposed by the U.N. committee, the Court
concluded that, properly interpreted, it did not require states to
prevent a "banned" person from travelling through their airspace
or airports while in transit to their country of nationality.1 s It
therefore did not justify governmental conduct to thwart Abdel-
razik's return to Canada.119 However, because he could face diffi-
culties en route from Khartoum to Toronto, the Government was
under a duty to provide an escort from Foreign Affairs to accom-
pany him.120
The Government did not appeal this decision and Abdelrazik
came home. This case clearly illustrates that, given the right
facts, courts are prepared to vindicate individuals' Charter rights,
and will not be deterred by a blanket invocation of national secu-
rity, Crown prerogative, broad discretion, and international rela-
tions.
V. THE DUTY To CONSULT
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms
existing Aboriginal rights and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peo-
ples of Canada, who are defined as including Indian, M6tis and
114. Id. at para. 42.
115. Id. at para. 152.
116. Id.
117. Id. at para. 153.
118. Id. at para. 126.
119. Id. at para. 129.
120. Id. at para. 166.
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Inuit peoples of Canada.'2 1 This addition to the Constitution has
provided a legal basis on which to build a process of reconciliation
between the descendants of the Aboriginal people who occupied
the land prior to the arrival of European settlers, and the reality
of Crown sovereignty.'22
Conflicts in some parts of Canada between the new settlers and
Aboriginal people were resolved by treaties between groups of
Aboriginal people and the Crown. Under these treaties, Aborigi-
nal peoples typically surrendered to the Crown the lands that they
had occupied, and from which they derived their sustenance, in
return for lands reserved for them and for other benefits. In the
absence of a treaty extinguishing rights to land traditionally occu-
pied by Aboriginal peoples and to the resources of that land, they
retained an interest in the land and the right to exploit its re-
sources, including the mining of minerals, fishing and hunting.
The Crown proclaimed itself to be protector of Aboriginal peoples
and is regarded by the courts as standing in a fiduciary-like rela-
tionship to them. The honour of the Crown requires it to deal with
Aboriginal peoples in a manner consistent with this relation-
ship.123
When the parties are unable to resolve claims to Aboriginal ti-
tle, resource rights or treaty rights, it may be necessary to resort
to litigation. The gathering of historical evidence and oral history
necessary to support the disputed claims, not to mention the trial
itself, can be very protracted indeed.124  Meanwhile, the claims
may be jeopardised by activities that could adversely affect the
lands or other rights that are the subject of the claims.
It would, of course, be possible for claimants to seek an inter-
locutory injunction to restrain such conduct pending the outcome
of the litigation. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has
pointed out that this is a far from perfect remedy, especially given
the length of time that it can take to establish a disputed Aborigi-
121. Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, § 35, Part II of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K).
122. R v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 31 (Can.).
123. The general principle that the Crown stands in a fiduciary-like relationship with
Canada's Aboriginal peoples was first developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin
v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.). The principle was expanded in R v. Sparrow,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.). For further discussion on the development of this principle see
J. TnmoTHY S. MCCABE, THE HONOUR OF THE CROWN AND ITS FIDUCIARY DuTIES TO
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (2008).
124. See generally Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.) (Abo-
riginal title); Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R. 507 (Aboriginal rights). Supreme Court discussion on
the practical difficulties relating to evidence in aboriginal rights and treaty claims.
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nal right and the adversarial nature of the process.125 It stated
that a negotiated resolution was preferable and, with this in mind,
created a duty in the Crown to consult with Aboriginal people be-
fore taking any action that could adversely affect their potential
rights and, in some circumstances, to accommodate Aboriginal
interests.126 This constitutional duty, now part of the rights pro-
tected by section 35, is grounded in the honour of the Crown. 127 It
is designed to further the process of reconciliation of prior Abo-
riginal occupation of the land and Crown sovereignty.128
The duty to consult arises when the Crown has actual or con-
structive knowledge of the potential existence of an Aboriginal
right and is contemplating conduct that may adversely affect it. 129
The duty is triggered fairly easily. However, its content is highly
variable, ranging on a procedural spectrum from, at the low end, a
simple requirement to give notice of the contemplated action and
to listen to Aboriginal concerns, to, at the high end, a duty to ac-
commodate the Aboriginal interests. 3 0  The most important fac-
tors determining the content of the duty are the strength of the
claim, and the likelihood and seriousness of the damage that may
be caused to the subject of the claim by the proposed action."'
Regulatory agencies may be authorized to discharge the Crown's
duty to consult in the context of an environmental assessment or
some other administrative review of the governmental decision in
question. 132
125. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, para.
14 (Can.).
126. Id. at para. 15; see also Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project
Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (Can.) (heard concurrently with Haida Nation);
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388,
paras. 33-34 (Can.) (the Supreme Court extended the duty to consult to the context of trea-
ty implementation).
127. Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, s. 35, Part II of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K).
128. Haida Nation, 3 S.C.R. 511, paras. 16-17; Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 31. In
2010, the Supreme Court released a trilogy of cases on the duty to consult that confirmed
the principles of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown as guiding Crown-Aboriginal
relations in Canada: Quebec (Att'y Gen.) v. Moses, [20101 1 S.C.R. 557 (Can.); Rio Tinto
Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, para. 32 (Can.); Beckman
v. Little Salmon, [20101 3 S.C.R. 103, para. 10 (Can.).
129. Haida Nation, 3 S.C.R. 511, para. 35.
130. Id. at paras. 43-44.
131. Id. at para. 45. See also Zena Charowsky, The Aboriginal Law Duty to Consult: An
introduction for Administrative Tribunals, 74 SASK. L. REV. 213, 219 (2011) (discussing the
scope and content of the duty to consult).
132. Haida Nation, 3 S.C.R. 511, at para. 53; Rio Tinto, 2 S.C.R. 650, paras. 55-58.
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When the duty to consult includes a duty to accommodate, "the
Crown must balance Aboriginal concerns reasonably with the po-
tential impact of the decision on the asserted right or title and
with other societal interests."'33 However, even at its most expan-
sive, the duty to consult does not confer on Aboriginal claimants
the right to veto any particular government action.134
The duty to consult has recently attracted wider public atten-
tion than usual. The federal Government has strongly supported
the construction of a pipeline to carry oil from the Alberta oil
sands to a port on British Columbia's coast for shipping to Asian
markets. The project appears to be deeply unpopular in British
Columbia because the Province will bear the environmental risks
of any oil spills from the pipeline itself or from tankers transport-
ing it by sea, without receiving much by way of offsetting benefits.
The pipeline is planned to cross lands that are subject to Abo-
riginal claims to lands and resources; until quite recently, treaties
had not been concluded in British Columbia to settle these claims.
It has been suggested that the federal Government has been insuf-
ficiently attentive to its duty to consult and that, without exten-
sive consultation and possible accommodation of Aboriginal inter-
ests, the whole project may become mired in litigation, with an
inevitably uncertain outcome. 35
VI. CONCLUSIONS
I did not select the current constitutional issues that I have in-
cluded in this paper with any particular theme in mind. Nonethe-
less, some of the cases illustrate the Supreme Court's commitment
to balance and process in the constitutional resolution of difficult
public policy issues involving competing interests. A willingness
to negotiate differences and to search for an acceptable common
ground is an essential component of the Canadian DNA:
Thus, the Court struck down the comprehensive scheme for a
national securities regulator on the ground that it threatened the
balance between the provinces' jurisdiction over property and civil
rights, and the federal jurisdiction over trade and commerce. The
133. Haida Nation, 3 S.C.R. 511, para. 50.
134. Id. at para 48.
135. Shawn McCarthy & Nathan Vanderklippe, Crucial Pipelines Jeopardized by Fail-
ure to Consult First Nations, Prentice Warns, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 27, 2012),
http//www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-
resources/crucial-pipelines-jeopardized-by-failure-to-consult-first-nations-prentice-
warns/article4572255/.
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Court noted that federal-provincial cooperation might produce a
scheme that better respected the foundational principles of Con-
federation. The Court also saw good faith constitutional negotia-
tion as the appropriate response to a vote for the secession of a
province by a clear majority on a clear question. The duty to con-
sult before decisions are made that may adversely affect potential
Aboriginal rights also purports to enable a proper balance to be
struck between the interests of Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.
The Court has sought to balance the right to liberty of the person
and the protection of national security by enhancing the proce-
dural rights afforded to detainees through the provision of special
advocates.
There are, in my view, many less satisfactory ways of address-
ing complex contemporary constitutional problems.

